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1. Introduction 
 
   It is very well known that fertility has been steadily declined to a remarkably 
lower level in Korea.  Young couples in recent years are likely to have one or 
two children at most.  When compared to higher fertility in the past, for example 
total fertility rate of 6.0 about 40 years ago, the achievement of lower fertility 
below the replacement level in such a short time period can be thought marvelous. 
Koreans and Korean society were shocked at the news report that total fertility 
rate in 2001 was just 1.3.  Mass media heralded as if Korean society suddenly 
entered the era of lower fertility in the onset of the 21st century.  In order to deal 
with the problem of lower fertility, conferences and workshops including scholars, 
government officials and policy makers were held in recent years.  Causes of 
rapid decline of fertility and possible policies to curb the extreme decrease of 
fertility were widely discussed in those occasions.  There is, however, no 
consensus on causes of sharp decline of fertility and possible treatment for the 
problems generated by decreasing fertility.  
The objective of this research is to understand causes of rapid decline of 
fertility from an economic point of view.  This research pays a particular 
attention to the impact of the economic crisis that swept down almost all Asian 
countries in the late 1990s.  The economic crisis has exerted a great impact on 
everyday life of ordinary people in most Asian countries including Korea.  
Fertility is no exception to this.  Not only timing of childbearing but also size of 
childbirth has been affected greatly by the economic constraints.  This research 
aims at showing briefly how the economic crisis has affected the recent fertility 
decline in Korea. 
 
2. Fertility Transition in Korea 
 
   Korea completed fertility transition under the replacement level in the middle 
of the 1980s.  In 1970, total fertility rate (TFR) was as high as 4.53.  But in four 
years, it fell to 3.81, namely below 4 in 1974.  In four years again, TFR dropped 
to 2.65, now below 3 in 1978.  Finally, TFR in Korea fell below 2, the 
replacement level in 1984 (see Table 1).  
Even after fertility reached the replacement level, it kept on decreasing far 
below the replacement level through the 1980s.  It hit the bottom in 1987, when 
TFR was 1.55.  Fertility, then, slightly began to increase up to 1.78 in TFR in 
1992.  It, however, once again turned downward since it peaked in 1992.  In 
particular, the pace of decline of fertility began to be accelerated after 1995.  
TFR which was 1.65 in 1995 turned into 1.58, 1.54, 1.47 and 1.42 in 1996, 1997, 
1998, and 1999, respectively.  Finally, fertility hit the bottom once again, 1.3 in 
TFR in 2001.   
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Although fertility has kept on decreasing even after it passed the replacement 
level in the early 1980s, Koreans and Korean society seem to be surprised at 
currently lower fertility as if the lower fertility has been reached so suddenly and 
unnoticed.  But it is never true to say that fertility has been lowered abruptly in 
Korea.  Except for the short period of fluctuation of TFR in the early 1990s, 
which is likely to happen when the pace of decline of fertility is so fast in a 
society (e.g. Bongaarts, 1999), fertility has kept on decreasing for a long time in 
Korea.  What makes us surprised is the unexpected pace of decline of fertility in 
the latter half of the 1990s.  I will describe more about this later. 
 
Table 1  CBR, TFR and Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea, 1970-2001 
 
Year CBR TFR Sex Ratio 
1970 31.2 4.53 109.5 
1971 31.2 4.54 109.0 
1972 28.5 4.14 109.5 
1973 28.4 4.10 104.6 
1974 26.6 3.81 109.4 
1975 24.8 3.47 112.4 
1976 22.2 3.05 110.7 
1977 22.7 3.02 104.2 
1978 20.4 2.65 111.3 
1979 23.0 2.90 106.4 
1980 22.7 2.83 105.3 
1981 22.7 2.66 107.2 
1982 21.8 2.42 106.8 
1983 19.5 2.08 107.3 
1984 16.9 1.76 108.3 
1985 16.2 1.67 109.4 
1986 15.6 1.60 111.7 
1987 15.1 1.55 108.8 
1988 15.2 1.56 113.3 
1989 15.2 1.58 111.7 
1990 15.4 1.59 116.5 
1991 16.6 1.74 112.4 
1992 16.9 1.78 113.6 
1993 16.4 1.67 115.3 
1994 16.3 1.67 115.2 
1995 16.0 1.65 113.2 
1996 15.3 1.58 111.6 
1997 14.8 1.54 108.2 
1998 13.8 1.47 110.1 
1999 13.2 1.42 109.8 
2000 13.4 1.47 110.2 
2001 11.6 1.30 109.0 
Source: KNSO(2002a:28-29, Table 1) 
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Korean society began to face a new demographic problem with the decreasing 
fertility in the 1980s.  Sex ratio at birth fluctuated until fertility reached the 
replacement level in the 1980s.  It was sometimes higher than the sex ratio at 
birth in a natural setting although selective abortion was not widely possible at 
those times.  But there was no wide distortion in sex ratio at birth before fertility 
was lowered to below the replacement level.  With the continued decline of 
fertility in the latter half of the 1980s, however, Korean society had to face a 
tremendously distorted sex ratio at birth.  Sex ratio at birth has fluctuated 
between 108.8 and 116.5 since 1986.  During this period, the years when sex 
ratio at birth was as low as below 110 were only 1987, 1997, and 1999.   Except 
for these three years since 1986, sex ratio at birth was always higher than 110, 
which cannot occur without artificial interruption on conception and childbirth 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Sex ratio for the first parity in recent years is absolutely as normal as we can 
observe in a natural setting.  Sex ratio for the second parity has also become as 
normal as that for the first parity.  For instance, sex ratio for the second parity 
was 112.4, 109.8, and 106.4 in 1992, 1996 and 2001, respectively.  But sex ratio 
for the third or higher parity is still likely to be deviated greatly from that of a 
natural setting.  It was as high as 206.0 for the third or higher parity in 1993.  
Since 1993 has the sex ratio for the third or higher parity been fluctuating between 
135.5 and 206.6.   Although it is not so high as in the past, sex ratio for the third 
or higher parity is still far from that of a natural setting.  This contributes to 
maintaining higher sex ratio at birth in current Korean society.  In a society of 
lower fertility, unbalanced sex ratio at birth raises another social problem of the 
instability of marriage market and family system. 
Figure 1  TFR and Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea, 1970-2001
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Demographers frequently analyze fertility only from the demographic 
perspective. In this research, I propose to consider the changes in fertility from the 
perspective of the family as a social institution with the help of the life course 
perspective.  Currently lower fertility is not an isolated demographic 
phenomenon from the changing family system and family values in Korea.  
Generally speaking, marriage signals the family formation in Korea.  Although 
marriage as a social institution seems to lose its significance gradually even in a 
Confucian society, cohabitation is not recognized as an alternative to marriage in 
Korean society.  Childbearing can be understood as the opportunity of the 
expanded reproduction of the family.  Children born out of wedlock, however, 
are very negatively stigmatized in Korea, so that the number of illegitimate births 
is still negligible.  Thus, fertility cannot help but have a direct and strong tie with 
marriage within Korean family system.  Divorce is one of the events signaling 
the dissolution of the family.  Although the significance of divorce in 
determining fertility is not so strong as marriage within family system, increasing 
divorce not only makes the family unstable but also affects fertility slightly in 
Korea.     
If we understand that fertility is closely related to marriage and divorce, and 
that marriage, childbearing and divorce are three major components of the family, 
changes of fertility needs to be seen from the perspective of the changing family 
system in Korea.  Then we can broaden our understanding of causes and effects 
of fertility change beyond a merely narrow demographic analysis. 
The following Table 2 and Figure 2 show how three components of the family 
have changed since 1970. 
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Table 2  Changes of Fertility, Marriage and Divorce in Korea, 1970-2001 
 
Year TFR CMR CDiR 
1970 4.53 9.2 0.4 
1971 4.54 7.3 0.3 
1972 4.14 7.3 0.4 
1973 4.10 7.6 0.4 
1974 3.81 7.5 0.4 
1975 3.47 8.0 0.5 
1976 3.05 8.0 0.5 
1977 3.02 8.3 0.6 
1978 2.65 9.3 0.5 
1979 2.90 9.4 0.5 
1980 2.83 10.6 0.6 
1981 2.66 9.4 0.6 
1982 2.42 9.2 0.7 
1983 2.08 9.2 0.7 
1984 1.76 8.9 0.9 
1985 1.67 9.2 1.0 
1986 1.60 9.2 1.0 
1987 1.55 9.1 1.0 
1988 1.56 9.2 1.0 
1989 1.58 9.4 1.0 
1990 1.59 9.3 1.1 
1991 1.74 9.6 1.1 
1992 1.78 9.6 1.2 
1993 1.67 9.0 1.3 
1994 1.67 8.7 1.4 
1995 1.65 8.7 1.5 
1996 1.58 9.4 1.7 
1997 1.54 8.4 2.0 
1998 1.47 8.0 2.5 
1999 1.42 7.7 2.5 
2000 1.47 7.0 2.5 
2001 1.30 6.7 2.8 
2002  6.4 3.0 
Source: KNSO(2002a:28-29, Table 1; 2002b:12, Table 1); KNSO(2003).     
 
   As I already discussed above, fertility has been decreasing rapidly in the 
1970s and 1980s, and somewhat slowly in the 1990s.  Fertility once again started 
declining steeply after 1997.   
Crude marriage rate (CMR, number of marriage per 1000 person) climbed from 
7.3 in 1971 to 10.6 in 1980.  And then it fluctuated between 8.7 and 9.4 from 
1981 to 1996.   Marriage, however, has been decreasing to a great extent after 
1996.  CMR turned to 8.0, 7.0 and 6.7 in 1998, 2000, and 2001, respectively.  
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The level of marriage rate in 2001 in terms of CMR is at a record low since 1970.   
Roughly speaking, marriage has been downward in the 1990s and began to 
decline rapidly after 1996.  Decrease of marriage at the societal level means less 
family formation in the 1990s and can be a significant cause of lower “period” 
fertility in a society where only childbearing within marriage is accepted.    
Divorce has been steadily increasing since 1970 as we see in Table 2 and Figure 
2. The pace of increase of divorce had been very slow until 1990.  It took 24 
years until crude divorce rate (CDiR, number of divorce per 1000 person) 
changed from 0.3 in 1970 to 1.4 in 1994.  Divorce, however, began to increase so 
remarkably in the 1990s.  In particular, divorce rate jumped up after 1996.  
CDiR was 1.7 in 1996.  It climbed to 2.0 in 1997.  Next year, it once again 
jumped up to 2.5.  Crude divorce rate had remained at 2.5 for three years.  And 
then it climbed to 2.8 in 2001.  In 2002, CDiR finally reached 3.0.   
 
 
Causes of the increase of divorce vary by period (see Appendix 3).  Increasing 
educational attainment by women and achievement of economic independence of 
women by participating in the labor market are among the causes of increasing 
divorce.  Changing family value may be another cause of increasing divorce.  
Regardless of causes of divorce, the trend of increasing divorce indicates that 
family dissolution is rising in Korea, which inevitably affects fertility downward 
although the impact on fertility decline is relatively small. 
As I already mentioned, marriage, fertility and divorce are three major 
components of the family, indicating an onset of the family formation, an 
expanded reproduction of the family and a beginning of family dissolution, 
respectively.  Fertility cannot vary apart from marriage and divorce because 
these three are so closely related within family system.  To repeat, we need to 
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adopt the viewpoint of the family even when we analyze fertility decline in Korea.  
This means that we must take into account more positively factors that affect the 
family, not just fertility. 
Interestingly, we find in Table 2 and Figure 2 that all three components of the 
family began to change rapidly in 1997.  This year falls on the outbreak of the 
economic crisis by which most Asian countries have been greatly affected.  In 
fact, the economic crisis in Korea resulted in great changes in everyday life of 
ordinary people from familial life to work to individual behavior.  Fertility is 
sure to be no exception to this change if we consider fertility as a component of 
the family that has been exposed to the impact of the economic crisis.  Marriage 
and divorce are also no exception, either.  Therefore, the impact of the economic 
crisis must be taken into account in explaining recent fertility decline in Korea.  
 
3. A Traditional Model for Fertility Decline in Korea 
 
Prior demographic and sociological research relied on several typical factors in 
explaining fertility decline in Korea.  Some of them are increasing educational 
attainment of women, increasing participation in the labor market by women, the 
lack of childcare facilities, changing family value preferring egalitarian 
relationship between a couple, weakened influence of parents and relatives on 
decision-making of childbearing, preference of quality of children to quantity, 
soaring cost in rearing children, fierce competition at the societal level and so on.  
All these factors affect fertility through proximate determinants such as marriage, 
contraception and abortion under the controlled fertility regime.  A traditional 
model including these factors can be depicted as follows. 
 
Figure 3  A Traditional Model for Fertility Decline in Korean Society 
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It is out of question that all these socioeconomic factors have contributed to 
reducing fertility since the early 1960s.  Prior demographic research by Korean 
demographers (e.g. Kwon, 1980) demonstrates fairly well how greatly proximate 
determinants have contributed to lowering fertility in Korea.  In fact, these 
socioeconomic factors have played a great role in completing fertility transition 
within such a short.  In addition, increasing age at marriage, wide practice of 
contraception, and practice of induced abortion are the proximate determinants 
through which all the socioeconomic factors affect fertility decline in Korean 
society. 
I, however, find that this model is not enough to explain why there occurred 
such a rapid change in all three components of the family such as marriage, 
fertility and divorce in Korean society after 1996.  In fact, marriage, fertility and 
divorce have greatly changed not only in Korea but also in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong after the economic crisis that swept down most Asian societies (see Chang, 
2003; Tu, 2003).  A traditional model cannot explain why Asian countries show 
concomitantly very similar patterns of change in marriage, fertility and divorce.  
Defenders of the traditional model, who do not consider the impact of the 
economic crisis in their model, may maintain that it takes time for the impact of 
the economic crisis to be reflected in current fertility decline in Asian societies, so 
that the traditional model is still appropriate in explaining fertility change in other 
Asian countries as well as in Korea.  I, however, do not have any concrete 
evidence that all the socioeconomic and value changes suddenly functioned 
concomitantly with the economic crisis toward reducing fertility more and more 
in Korea.  For example, it is not true to assert that family value changed to a 
great extent toward lowering fertility in Korea after the economic crisis.  
Women’s participation in the labor market did not increase so much as to affect a 
rapid fertility decline.  Can we assume that the lack of childcare facilities has 
suddenly was the key factor for female workers to withdraw childbearing after the 
economic crisis?  I do not have any evidence to support these kinds of inferences.  
For this reason, I believe we need another model in order to explain more 
appropriately the rapid change in marriage and divorce as well as in fertility after 
the economic crisis.  To get a clue for understanding rapid changes in fertility, 
marriage and divorce, let us look at the result of the decomposition of percentage 
change in total fertility rate since 1955.  The following Table 3 shows the result 
of the decomposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Population and Social Security (Population), Supplement to Volume 1 
 582
Table 3  Decomposition of Percentage Change of Total Fertility Rate, 1955-2000 
 
  1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00
Percentage Change 5.6 -16.8 -17.6 -13.4 -24.7 -25.7 -18.3 1.2 -5.4 
          
Marital Status -3.9 -6.3 -3.5 -3.5 -5.6 -6.4 -6.5 -5.8 -9.9 
  age at marriage -6.9 -7.6 -4.0 -3.7 -6.3 -6.7 -7.9 -5.6 -9.6 
  divorce or bereavement 3.0 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.4 -0.2 -0.3 
          
Marital Fertility 9.5 -10.5 -14.1 -9.9 -19.1 -19.3 -11.8 7.0 4.5 
  contraception - -1.7 -9.5 -5.9 -23.0 -23.9 -13.4 -5.3 -7.4 
  Abortion -3.1 -5.1 -4.6 -4.0 3.9 4.6 1.6 12.3 11.9 
  Other 12.6 -3.7 - -  - -  -  -  
Source: Jun (2003:90, Table 3-2) 
 
In Table 3, it is evident that the pace of the decline of fertility was great 
between 1960 and 1990.  In particular, percentage change was the greatest in the 
period of 1980-1985.  During this period, TFR decreased by 25.7%.  In the 
period of 1975-1980, TFR also dropped remarkably by 24.7%.  Until 1990, the 
practice of contraception contributed to fertility decline the most among all factors.  
For example, the percentage change of TFR during the period of 1975-1980 and 
1980-1985 when fertility was lowered to below the replacement level was almost 
entirely due to the wide practice of contraception.  So we cannot say too much 
about the pivotal role of contraception in fertility decline until 1990. 
On the other hand, fertility increased a little bit during the period of 1990-1995 
as we saw in Tables 1 and 2.  During this period, the role of abortion in reducing 
fertility disappeared completely.  Although changes in age at marriage and the 
practice of contraception still contributed to lowering TFR, other factors offset the 
contribution of age at marriage and the practice of contraception in fertility 
decline. 
The period in which we need to pay more attention in this research is that of 
1995-2000.  The economic crisis in Asian countries started during this period.  
Although the percentage change seems to be rather small compared to that of 
other periods, we need to focus on the fact that fertility once again turned 
downward after the period of 1990-1995.  What factors contributed to lowering 
total fertility rate in the period of 1995-2000?  The practice of contraception still 
worked fairly well in reducing total fertility rate during this period.  More 
important is that the influence of age at marriage began to surpass that of the 
practice of contraception in reducing fertility although the difference is not so big 
in the 1990s.  Divorce, although the influence on lowering fertility is very 
limited, also began to play a role toward reducing fertility in recent years.   
In order to see the changing influence of age at marriage and the practice of 
contraception in lowering fertility, it is helpful to understand the trend of marital 
fertility rate in Korea.  As for the lower fertility for the last few years, some 
Korean feminists attributed it to the lack of childcare facilities supported by the 
government.  Their logic is that the lowest fertility results from that married 
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female workers avoid childbearing because of the lack of childcare facilities.  If 
their assertions are right, then we have to find that marital fertility has declined 
because most married female workers are likely to contribute to lowering marital 
fertility by avoiding childbearing.  Is it true? 
Table 4 shows the trends of age-specific marital fertility rate between 1980 and 
2000.  Unlike our expectation, marital fertility has not diminished since 1980.  
On the contrary, after total marital fertility rate plunged into the bottom in 1985, it 
steadily climbed to 3.56, 3.63 and 3.69 in 1990, 1995 and 2000, respectively.   
 
Table 4  Age-Specific Marital Fertility Rate in Korea, 1980-2000 
 
Age / Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
20-24 404.0 423.0 426.0 377.0 364.0 
25-29 286.0 194.0 219.0 253.0 255.0 
30-34 121.0 44.0 55.0 76.0 97.0 
35-39 43.0 10.0 10.0 16.0 19.0 
40-44 17.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 
45-49 7.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TMFR 4.39  3.37 3.56 3.63 3.69 
Source: Jun(2003:93, Table 3-4) 
 
I do not have an appropriate answer to the question why marital fertility has not 
diminished while total fertility rate has greatly declined.  I can only say that 
married women, once they got married, did not avoid childbearing under the 
lower fertility regime during the latter half of the 1980s and the entire 1990s 
unlike some feminists asserted.  This implies that recent fertility decline is not 
necessarily due to the fact that married female workers are avoiding childbearing 
by practicing contraception or abortion.  On the contrary, other factors rather 
than the practice of contraception may play more important roles in lowering 
fertility since the economic crisis.  We already know from the discussion above 
that increasing age at marriage and the spread of divorce gain more significance in 
explaining the decline of fertility since the economic crisis.  The next step is to 
contrive a new mechanism to explain why age at marriage still rises and divorce 
occurs frequently. 
 
4. A New Model for Recent Fertility Decline Since the Economic Crisis 
 
I propose a new model to explain recent fertility decline since the economic 
crisis.  The most fundamental change at the societal level that results from the 
economic crisis is the reconstruction of the labor market according to the principle 
of “new liberalism” in Korea.  At the early stage of the economic crisis, a 
number of corporations had to go bankrupt.  This directly resulted in the sudden 
disappearance of a number of “permanent” jobs for workers.  Youths who 
finished their schooling tried to enter the labor market but found that there were 
few jobs available to them.  All these resulted in soaring unemployment rate for 
all age groups.  To cope with the crisis, Korean government initiated to 
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reconstruct the labor market not only to increase jobs sharable by many 
unemployed but also to induce foreign investment.  As for the government, the 
only way to accomplish both goals seems to adopt the principle of “new 
liberalism.”  The core principle of the reconstruction of the labor market in 
accordance with the spirit of “new liberalism” was “flexibility.”  According to 
this principle, workers should be possible to be laid off whenever necessary.  
Rather than regular full-time workers, part-time or temporary workers have been 
preferred in various work places by owners.   
This effort to reconstruct the labor market might succeed in creating a number 
of new jobs available at the societal level.  Also, the highly soared 
unemployment rate gradually declined.  This might be the positive result of the 
reconstruction of the labor market.  But the barrier to the entrance into the labor 
market for younger people is still so high that they always have to undergo a kind 
of “war” to find a job in the labor market.  On the other hand, the condition of 
labor or job status has become deteriorated and unstable.  The concept of lifetime 
job has suddenly gone away in Korea since the economic crisis.  The spread of 
part-time or temporary jobs made it impossible for people to settle down at a work 
place.  The fear of unexpected layoff made people adopt a new way of life 
different from that before the economic crisis.  Loyalty to the work place or 
commitment to their task has been weakened remarkably.  
Who has been the most victim of the changing labor market since the economic 
crisis?  It is usually youths.  Under the economic hardship, most work places 
want workers with various experiences who need not additional training or 
reeducation.  On the contrary, youths who are just out of school are likely to have 
no career or prior work experience.  They usually need training or reeducation 
for new work places.  It may take months or a year to train new comers.  It is 
natural in the age of economic hardship that owners of corporations avoid 
recruiting inexperienced youths to save time and financial resources.  This 
automatically results in higher unemployment rate for youths with insufficient 
experiences who have to make a transition from school to work, marriage and 
childbearing. 
Layoff affects greatly adults’ life, too.  Once they are laid off, it is so difficult 
for them to make a reentry into work in a formal sector in Korea.  The most 
frequent type of the transition to reentry into work is the entry into self-run small 
business with unpaid family labor.  Because of the lack of experience in that kind 
of work for them, and of fierce competition in the fields, however, self-run small 
business is highly likely to fail.  This inevitably worsens economic difficulty for 
them, which is likely to make their marital life end in divorce.  Soaring rate of 
divorce since the economic crisis is sure to reflect this situation in Korea.   
My model is based on the above discussions.  In this model, I assume the 
changing labor market as the most significant factor in explaining rapid decline of 
fertility.  This affects the life of both youths and adults.  As for youths, they are 
likely to face the difficulty in the transition from school to work.  Less jobs at the 
societal level sometimes make it impossible for youths to transit to work after 
schooling.  Although they succeed in making a transition to work, the job is 
likely to be part-time or temporary.  Korean male with a part-time or temporary 
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job, who still assumes the role of breadwinner, inevitably hesitates to make a 
transition to marriage.  High cost of housing also aggravates the possibility of the 
transition to marriage for single males who are usually in charge of arranging a 
house before marriage in Korea.   
 
Figure 4  A New Model for Recent Fertility Change in Korean Society 
 
 
 
As for Korean females, they have become independent economically with 
increasing educational attainment and by participation in the labor market.  Their 
attitude towards marriage and family is also undergoing a huge change.  Most 
Korean females do not like to be lifetime single, but also do not like to hurry into 
marriage even when they pass so-called “appropriate age at marriage.”   Social 
norm on age at marriage has greatly weakened nowadays in Korean society.  
More significant in relation to the declining marriage for Korean females is that 
the number of “marriageable” male has become less and less since the economic 
crisis.  Although younger females want to get married, they are difficult to find 
“marriageable” males who are at least comparable with them or in better 
conditions.  So Korean females also have difficulty in the transition to work, 
marriage and childbearing as males do.  
As for divorce, I will not repeat my discussion because I already mentioned 
above.  It is noteworthy that divorce should be considered in future research on 
fertility decline in Korea although the impact is rather small.              
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5. Analysis 
 
At this moment, it is not easy to prove my hypothesis emphasizing the impact 
of the changing labor market on fertility decline since the economic crisis in 
Korea.  Above all, I need data that shows the trends of the transition to work, 
marriage and childbearing at the individual level.  But there is no such data 
available at this moment.  I rather like to prove my hypothesis using some 
aggregate data although my discussion is limited.   
The following Table 5 shows the trends of age at marriage in Korea for both males 
and females.  Mean age at marriage for both males and females has been 
increasing as if there is no limit.  Most Korean demographers predicted in the 
1980s that age at marriage would not increase so much because they thought it 
would already reach the ceiling of age at marriage.  But their predictions have 
been proved wrong.  For ten years in the 1980s, mean age at marriage increased 
for both males and females by 1.4 and 1.6 years, respectively.  Age at marriage 
never stopped growing in the 1990s, either.  What is interesting is that the 
increase of age at marriage in the 1990s was accelerated in the latter half of the 
1990s.  In particular, it is tremendous since the economic crisis.  Age at 
marriage in 2002 is at a record high, 29.8 for males and 27.0 for females.1   But 
it is more probable that this record high age at marriage will be renewed with 
much higher age at marriage in 2003 and afterwards unless the economic situation 
affecting the transition to marriage for males and females changes positively.  
This rapidly increasing age at marriage since the economic crisis is an evidence to 
support my hypothesis. 
 
Table 5  Singulate Mean Age at Marriage in Korea, 1981-2002 
 
Year Male Female Difference 
1981  26.4  23.2  3.2  
1985  27.0  24.1  2.9  
1990  27.8  24.8  3.0  
1991  28.0  24.9  3.1  
1992  28.1  25.0  3.1  
1993  28.1  25.1  3.0  
1994  28.3  25.2  3.1  
1995  28.4  25.4  3.0  
1996  28.4  25.5  2.9  
1997  28.6  25.7  2.9  
1998  28.9  26.1  2.8  
1999  29.1  26.3  2.8  
2000  29.3  26.5  2.8  
2001 29.6 26.8 2.8 
2002 29.8 27.0 2.8 
Source: KNSO(2001:20, Table III-10); KNSO(2003). 
                                                  
1 Japan is no exception to this. See Retherford et al. (2001). 
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The increasing age at marriage reflects the growing proportion of single for 
both males and females.  Following Tables 6 and 7 show respectively how 
proportion of single has been changing for both males and females in Korea. 
 
Table 6  Proportion of Single for Male by Age in Korea, 1970-2000 
 
Age 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  
15-19 99.7  99.7  99.8  99.9  99.9  99.8  99.7  
20-24 92.6  92.9  93.1  94.4  96.4  96.3  97.5  
25-29 43.4  47.0  45.2  50.7  57.3  64.4  71.0  
30-34 6.4  7.0  7.3  9.4  13.9  19.5  28.1  
35-39 1.2  1.4  1.7  2.7  3.8  6.6  10.6  
40-44 0.4  0.5  0.7  1.1  1.5  2.7  4.9  
45-49 0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.3  2.4  
Source: KNSO, 1960-2000. 
 
Table 7  Proportion of Single for Female by Age in Korea, 1970-2000 
 
Age 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  
15-19 97.1  97.4  98.2  99.1  99.5  99.2  99.3  
20-24 57.2  62.5  66.1  72.1  80.5  83.3  89.1  
25-29 9.7  11.8  14.1  18.4  22.1  29.6  40.1  
30-34 1.4  2.1  2.7  4.2  5.3  6.7  10.7  
35-39 0.4  0.7  1.0  1.6  2.4  3.3  4.3  
40-44 0.2  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.1  1.9  2.6  
45-49 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.0  1.7  
Source: KNSO, 1960-2000. 
 
   It is clear that proportion of single for both males and females has increased 
greatly during the fertility transition until the late 1990s.  But we must note that 
proportion of single in thirties for males and in twenties and early thirties for 
females began to increase tremendously between 1995 and 2000.  For example, 
the proportion of single for females aged 25-29 was 29.6 in 1995.  However, it 
jumped up to 40.1 for the same age group in 2000.  For males, the proportion of 
single aged 30-34 was 19.5 in 1995, but increased to 28.1 in 2000.    
Why do age at marriage and proportion of single increase so much in recent 
years?  Can we regard these as proving my hypothesis that the transition to 
marriage has been retarded or delayed because of the economic hardship?  Then, 
we need to prove that economic situation for youths has been aggravated in recent 
years.  The following Tables 8 and 9 show the trends of unemployment rate for 
both males and females, respectively.  
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Table 8 Unemployment Rate for Male by Age, 1995-2001 
 
Age 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
15-19 9.1  8.9  11.6  25.3  22.5  14.5  14.7  
20-24 7.7  8.2  8.9  19.6  13.6  12.4  11.5  
25-29 3.7  4.2  4.9  11.1  10.5  6.9  7.1  
30-34 1.7  1.8  2.3  6.3  6.2  4.3  3.6  
35-39 1.7  1.4  1.8  6.1  5.2  3.5  3.3  
40-44 1.4  1.4  1.7  6.1  5.6  3.4  3.3  
45-49 1.3  1.3  1.5  6.5  6.0  4.2  3.2  
50-54 1.2  1.4  1.6  6.9  6.4  3.4  3.3  
 
Table 9  Unemployment Rate for Female by Age, 1995-2001 
 
Age 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
15-19 7.5  6.6  8.7  17.5  17.0  12.7  12.4  
20-24 4.9  4.4  6.2  11.9  10.7  7.6  7.4  
25-29 1.9  2.0  2.8  6.5  5.3  3.8  3.9  
30-34 0.8  0.9  1.6  5.0  4.7  2.7  2.4  
35-39 0.8  0.8  1.6  4.7  4.4  2.5  2.2  
40-44 0.7  0.8  1.7  4.7  4.6  2.9  2.4  
45-49 0.5  0.5  1.0  3.8  3.6  2.2  1.8  
50-54 0.3  0.5  0.9  3.8  3.2  1.9  2.1  
 
As anybody can expect, the unemployment rate soared between 1997 and 1998 
because of the impact of the economic crisis that began in 1997.  The 
unemployment rate more than doubled for all age groups regardless of sex 
between 1997 and 1998.  Although unemployment rate has been decreasing after 
1997, it is still high.   
Because of the custom of age discrimination in employment, those who once 
lose the opportunity to be employed right after schooling are very hard to find a 
job in a formal sector next time.  In fact, there are a number of youths who are 
not employed right after schooling, and consequently face the barrier of age 
discrimination in entering the labor market afterwards in Korean society.  A 
significant part of those who fail to enter the labor market right after schooling are 
likely to give up employment.  These youths who do not seek employment any 
more are usually omitted in calculating unemployment rate by the government.     
This inevitably leads to underestimate of unemployment rate in Korea.  
Considering this custom in calculating employment, we can assume easily that the 
real unemployment rate for youths after the economic crisis has been higher than 
that calculated by the government.   
The trends of high unemployment rate for youths since the economic crisis 
indicate that Korean youths have had difficulty in the transition from school to 
work.  Although some younger people succeed in the transition to work, their 
jobs are likely to be part-time or temporary because the proportion of part-time 
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and temporary jobs has surpassed that of regular full-time jobs in the labor market 
since 1999.  All these conditions are sure to make Korean youths delay the 
transition to marriage. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Korean society has experienced a lowering fertility even after she completed 
fertility transition in the 1980s.  Total fertility rate in 2001 was 1.3.  It is 
expected that TFR would be lowered below 1.3 afterwards.  Nobody knows how 
low the fertility will decrease in Korea in the future. 
Demographers and social scientists have explained the mechanism of lowering 
fertility in Korea as well as in other Asian societies by the “traditional” way in 
terms of educational attainment of women, women’s participation in the labor 
market, changing family values, for example.  I do not deny that the “traditional’ 
way of explanation has been significant in understanding long-term fertility 
transition from high to low fertility in Korea.  However, this “traditional” model 
is not sufficient to understand the recently sharp decline of fertility in Korea.  
Neither is it in other Asian societies.   
We must note that recent low fertility is to some extents attributed to the 
“tempo” effects as Bongaarts, Kohler and other demographers already indicted 
mainly in the context of developed countries (Bongaarts, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; 
Bongaarts and Feeney, 1999; Kohler and Philpov, 2001; Kohler, Billari and 
Ortega, 2002).  Tempo changes usually mean that timing of childbearing has 
been delayed in recent years.  First of all, age at marriage began to increase 
sharply.  In addition, first birth interval has increased for recent marriage cohorts 
in Korea (Eun, 2001).  These changes in timing of childbearing directly affect 
the “period” fertility, which results in lowering fertility in Korea.       
As long as the currently lower fertility is mainly due to changing tempo of 
childbearing, we need to concentrate on factors that cause changes in age at 
marriage and timing of childbirth.  In this research, I assume that the increasing 
age at marriage is caused by the difficulty in the transition to marriage followed 
by the difficulty in the transition to work by both young males and females, not by 
changing family values or by increasing participation in the labor market by 
women.  The difficulty in the transition to work and marriage comes from an 
enormous transformation in the labor market that began after the economic crisis.  
As the labor market becomes flexible, part-time and temporary jobs surpasses 
regular full-time jobs nowadays.  Layoff is possible whenever necessary by 
owners.  The number of jobs becomes less and less, on the one hand, because of 
the worsening economic situation and, on the other hand, due to the developing 
information technology.  All these conditions have made it difficult for youths to 
make a transition to work first, and then to marriage and childbearing. 
The impact of the economic crisis is in fact wide in everyday life of ordinary 
people in Korea.  Fertility is no exception to this.  Nonetheless, the impact of 
the economic crisis on fertility decline has never been appropriately dealt with in 
prior demographic research on low fertility.  The cause of currently lowering 
fertility in Korea is rooted in the difficulty in the transition to work, marriage and 
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childbearing for both males and females, which is the direct result of the 
transformation of the labor market since the economic crisis.  This is why I 
propose a new model for understanding recent fertility decline in Korea in this 
research. 
  
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1  Proportion of Female Married by Age, 1970-2000 
 
Age 1970  1975  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  
15-19 2.8 2.6 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.7 
20-24 42.3 37.2 33.7 27.8 19.5 16.7 10.7 
25-29 88.4 86.8 84.9 80.9 77.3 69.9 59.1 
30-34 94.6 94.4 94.3 93.3 92.4 91.4 86.9 
35-39 92.0 93.2 93.4 93.3 92.8 92.2 90.7 
40-44 84.8 88.2 90.1 90.4 90.3 90.1 88.9 
45-49 76.8 79.1 83.1 85.9 86.1 86.4 86.1 
 
Appendix 2  Proportion of First Birth by Duration of Marriage in Korea, 
1992-2001 
 
Duration 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
<2 Years 84.1 82.8 81.5 82.9 83.4 82.6 81.0 79.9 77.5 76.5 
2-3 12.2 12.5 13.4 12.6 12.2 12.9 14.4 15.1 16.8 17.2 
4-5 2.2 2.8 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.5 3.9 
6-9 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 
10+ 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Appendix 3  Trends of Reasons of Divorce, 1992-2001 
 
Reason 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000 2001 
Conflict between Couple 86.2 84.8 83.1 83.0 83.2 82.3 80.7 80.2 74.5 74.0 
Economic Reasons 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.5 4.3 6.6 7.0 10.7 11.6 
Health Problem 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Others 10.6 11.6 13.0 13.1 12.3 12.4 11.8 11.9 13.9 13.7 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Population and Social Security (Population), Supplement to Volume 1 
 591
Appendix 4  Singulate Mean Age at Marriage, 1981-2002 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5  Proportion of Single for Male by Age in Korea, 1970-2000 
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Appendix 6  Proportion of Single for Female by Age in Korea, 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7  Proportion of Female Married by Age, 1970-2000 
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Appendix 8  Proportion of First Birth by Duration of Marriage in  Korea, 
1992-2001 
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